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Abstract. Typically, a small and open economy trades goods at given world prices.
Here, we present a model of a very open small economy, where capital and labor are
internationally mobile, too. When investing into infrastructure, the economy’s
government attracts not only mobile capital but mobile labor, also. These capital and
labor inflows into the economy reinforce each other. They contribute to rising welfare
for land owning indigenous households. But all potential benefits for land renting
immigrant households are capitalized into higher land rents. - The paper is also an
attempt to give an account of the recent economic boom in Ireland.
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1. Introduction
This paper is an attempt to capture a number of typical features of the “very open small
economy”. Typically, being open implies that an economy freely trades goods with
other countries in the rest of the world. Sometimes, being open also allows for the
international mobility of capital. In this paper, being very open implies that not only
goods and capital can freely flow in or leave the economy - labor can too. Being very
open and small, then, implies that the prices of tradable goods as well as the prices of
the two mobile factors are determined in world markets. They are not subject to
changes in local supply and demand decisions. In this context, we will ask which
additional insights the “very open small economy”-assumption can produce over and
above the usual “open small economy”-assumption. To this end, we will often compare
the very open small economy with the merely open small economy.
The paper is also an attempt to bind together some stylized facts of the recent Irish
economic success. The assumptions of the model presented in the following sections
are in many ways specific to Ireland. Interestingly, the model generates a number of
results that closely resemble the Irish growth performance, also. Thus “calibrated”, the
model offers predictions on the impact of an adverse shock that has not been
encountered to date. But, of course, we could also ask whether the results derived in
this paper also apply to other economies - such as Singapore, Hong Kong, or
Luxemburg - which by our definition are very open and small, or whether, more
generally yet, they even apply to regions or cities.
The paper draws on earlier work in international, regional and urban economics. In
using duality theory to describe general equilibrium in models of trade, the paper builds
on the methodology set out by Dixit and Norman (1980). In letting government
provide a public input to the private production sector within the Dixit/Norman-
framework, we borrow an idea explored by Kanemoto (1980) and Michael/
Hatzipanayotou (1996). In allowing capital mobility alongside trade in goods and in
assuming the existence of specific factors in at least some of the industries, the paper is
also closely related to Neary (1995). Finally, the explicit treatment of the small
economy’s land market not only adds a non-tradable good to the economy and will
thereby, given an inelastic supply of land, cause congestion. It also embraces a central2
theme in the urban economics of the “open city”. There, if migration is costless, the
benefits related to the public input may in the extreme case be completely capitalized
into land rents.
The paper is in seven parts. The second section sets up the assumptions of the model
and presents the agents’ behavioral functions. The third section discusses the general
equilibrium of the model. In the fourth section, we focus on the consequences of public
infrastructure investment. In section 5, we discuss the corresponding welfare
implications. The sixth section has a case study that matches the model’s central
assumptions and outcomes with stylized facts of the recent Irish economic success
(“Celtic Tiger”). Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
In what follows, we focus on a “very open small economy”, or, equivalently, on a
“region”. Sometimes, we will refer to this very open small economy more briefly as
“Island”  ) (I . Households in Island will also be “indigenous households”. Besides
Island, a larger region exists which we will call “Mainland”  ) (M . To any other parts of
the world besides Island and Mainland we will refer as the “Rest of the World” and to
their households as “foreign households”. In terms of population size, Mainland is very
much larger than Island, while the Rest of the World is again very much larger than
Mainland.
By focusing on a “small and very open economy”, we not only invoke the standard
small and open economy properties of (i) exogenous world prices for tradable goods
and (ii) an exogenous return to internationally mobile capital. We also allow (iii) labor
to migrate between Island and Mainland, with the reservation utility level determined in
Mainland and unaffected by Island’s actions. Moreover and (iv), we assume that
migration from Mainland to Island affects the prices of non-tradables in Island while it
does not change any non-tradable’s price in Mainland. Hence, it is Island’s smallness
that allows us to focus on Island’s economy without having to worry about potential
repercussions from Mainland or the Rest of the World. And it is Island’s openness in3
terms of goods and factor mobility that creates an overlap between regional economics
and traditional international economics.
2
Island’s production takes place within three distinct sectors of the economy. First,
there is a tradable goods sector that consists of two industries, electronic consumer
goods E  and food F . While each industry employs an industry-specific type of
capital, it also relies on labor as a second input. As is typical of such a model of
“specific factors”, only labor can move from one industry to the other. It is in this
tradable goods sector where the economy’s properties of being small as well as very
open most visibly combine.
However, the degree of mobility varies by factor. Capital specific to electronics K  is
perfectly mobile, moving costlessly to whichever region offers the highest return.
Labor L is somewhat less mobile, being allowed to move only between Island and
Mainland. Labor, too, changes location costlessly. The part of the labor force L that is
indigenous to Island will be denoted by I , while the number of Mainland immigrants
in Island is M . Thus,   I M L + ” .
3 Finally, capital specific to food processing C  is
assumed not mobile at all.
4 Usually, we will refer to mobile “electronics capital” K
simply as “capital” as opposed to immobile “food capital” C .
Island’s second sector is the non-tradables sector. In this sector, land T  is supplied to
whoever is prepared to pay the going price or “land rent” q. Thus, land as the
nontradable “good” is not actually produced but already available for use. -
Government is Island’s third sector. Here, land is used to produce a public input g
which benefits all firms’ productivity (but not households’ utility).
5 In a very simple
fashion, we assume that it takes one unit of land to produce one unit of output.
                                               
2 Of course, this theme goes back at least to Krugman (1991) who insists that the distinction between
countries and regions becomes increasingly meaningless with more factor mobility.
3 This choice of terminology might lead to misunderstandings. So, early on, it should be stressed that
“immigrants” are “incumbent immigrants”, i.e. they are the stock of immigrants already in Island and
not an inflow of immigrants.
4 The assumption of capital mobility differing by sector follows Neary (1995).
5  This intermediate good function is why the public output g   also is a public “input”. Kanemoto
(1980) and Michael/Hatzipanayotou (1996) have a general treatment of a public input within the
Dixit/Norman-framework that includes the very special case built into this model.4
Beyond land, no other inputs are needed. Examples of this public input g  might be
industrial estates.
6
Let electronics output E be produced according to the neoclassical production
function  ) , ( E
E L K f g  where K  is the quantity of specific capital in electronics and  E L
is the amount of labor employed in electronics. Food production is by the neoclassical
production function  ) , ( E
F L L C f - g . Here, C  is the specific capital in the food
industry and  E L L -  is the food industry’s employment. Obviously the public input
serves both industries equally well. Infrastructure services g  provided by the industrial
estates enter into electronics and food production much like a product augmenting
technological externality (see Dixit/Norman, 1980). Note that a change in g  on its
own does not affect the allocation of labor across the two industries.
7 - Each of the
two production functions are assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale with respect
to its two inputs. The exogenous tradable goods prices we will indicate by the price
vector  ) , ( F E p p p = .
Note that the tradable sector’s revenue (or GDP-) function is simpler than it might
seem. While there are three different sectors, government and the nontradables sector
use an input (land) that is never employed in the tradables sector. Conversely, the
tradables sector uses three inputs (labor and the two industry specific types of capital)
that are employed neither in the government sector nor in the nontradables sector.
Hence, whatever the output prices  p  and q, there are no possibilities of factor
substitution between the government sector and the nontradables sector on the one
hand and the tradables sector on the other hand. Maximum revenue in the nontradables
sector is simply given by Tq. Maximum revenue in the tradables sector at given output
prices, factor endowments and at an exogenous level of the public input is given by the
                                               
6 It is tempting to think of the public input as transportation infrastructure - roads being the most
prominent use of urban land for public good purposes. However, this model’s economy does not have
an internal urban structure so that we have to refrain from this interpretation.
7 In particular, we assume that there is no “targeting” of the electronics industry. Discrimination
against the food industry, e.g. by providing club good type public inputs, would strengthen the
model’s results, but is not needed in what follows.5
revenue function  ) , , , , ( g L C K p r . This revenue function, as is clear from the
discussion above, depends neither on the land rent q nor on the land area T .
As the capital stock specific to the food industry C  has earlier been assumed
immobile, it will not vary throughout the model. Hence, we drop C  from the notation
of the revenue function. By the envelope theorem, the revenue function has the
property that its partial derivatives  ) , , , ( g L K p rK  and  ) , , , ( g L K p rL  equal the value
marginal products of capital (i.e., electronics capital) and labor, respectively, evaluated
at the optimum allocation of labor  ) , ( E E L L L -  to the two industries. These value
marginal products can also be interpreted as the return to capital and as the wage rate,
respectively, in competitive equilibrium.
Later on, it will prove interesting to know the precise reactions of these factor returns
to changes in the total stock of capital or labor. After all, Island’s stocks of capital and
labor are liable to change due to their mobility. But these reactions are standard in the
specific factors model and can easily be read off a Ricardo-Viner-type diagram.
8 An
inflow of labor depresses the wage and drives up the capital rental, hence
0 ) , , , ( < g L K p rLL  and  0 ) , , , ( > g L K p rKL . An inflow of capital depresses the capital
rental and drives up the wage rate, so that  0 ) , , , ( < g L K p rKK  and  0 ) , , , ( > g L K p rLK .
Leaving the original allocation of labor unaffected, a higher level of g  works exactly
like a simultaneous increase of both prices  E p  and  F p  by increasing the wage rate as
well as both capital rentals, i.e. in particular  0 ) , , , ( > g g L K p rL   and
0 ) , , , ( > g g L K p rK .
3. General Equilibrium
As equilibrium prices  p  for the two tradable goods are exogenous throughout this
paper, we can ignore the two corresponding equilibrium equations. We let food be the
numeraire, i.e.  1 ” F p . Since the exogenous terms of trade  E p  will not vary
throughout what follows, we drop the price vector  p from the notation of the revenue
                                               
8 For this type of diagram see, for example, Dixit/Norman (1980, p. 40-43). For the following second-
order derivatives see the Appendix for more details.6
function. Equilibrium in Island’s economy is described by the following set of six
equations.
(1) t g - + = q L K r u q e L
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Equation (1) gives the budget constraint for each of the I  indigenous households.
Preferences are identical and are represented by the common expenditure function
) , (
i u q e . Indigenous households derive utility from living on a parcel of Island’s land
as well as from consuming the two tradable goods, food and electronic consumer
goods. Each indigenous household inelastically supplies one unit of labor to the
tradable goods sector, receiving his value marginal product  ) , , ( g L K rL  in turn.
Moreover, each indigenous household owns one unit of land. Selling this unit, he
receives a land rent of q. Net total income, then, is land income plus labor income
minus taxes. - With monotonous preferences, this net total income is exhausted by
expenditure on tradable and nontradable goods.
Equation (2) is the typical budget constraint for each of the M  households that in the
past have immigrated into Island. And it also is the budget constraint for any newly
arriving immigrant households  M D . Immigrants’ preferences are identical to
indigenous households’ preferences. Also, immigrants are similar to indigenous
households in that they earn income from supplying labor  ) , , ( g L K rL  and in that they7
have to pay the same taxes t . But since immigrants are not indigenous to Island, they
do not receive any land income.
This description of an immigrant household is very much aimed at “remigrating
expatriates”, i.e. formerly indigenous households that in the past have migrated to
Mainland and now consider coming back to Island. Naturally, then, do they have the
same preferences as indigenous households. Also, it might seem very reasonable to let
both types of households have different land endowments. After all, households that
had left Island for Mainland in the past would likely have been poorer than households
that stayed. - Although this immigrant concept excludes immigrants with different
preferences or types of income, it is not as restrictive as it seems. In a broader sense,
this concept can also reasonably capture immigration from Island’s “rural areas” or,
more relevant even, the idea that formerly unemployed rejoin the labor force.
9
Equation (3) is the equilibrium condition for Island’s land market. Each of the I
indigenous households supplies one unit of land, giving rise to an aggregate land
supply T  just equal to I . Demand for land comes from indigenous households,
immigrant households and government. By Shepard’s Lemma, indigenous and
immigrant households’ (Hicksian) individual demand functions are the derivatives of
the expenditure functions with respect to the land rent. Hence we have  ) , (
i
q u q e and
) , (
m
q u q e , respectively. Due to its simple production function, the government’s
inelastic demand for land is simply equivalent to the amount of the public input g  that
it intends to provide. In that sense, land not only is a consumption good for households
but serves as an intermediate good for the tradable goods sector, too.
In the very open small economy, equations (4) and (5) are no-migration-conditions for
the two mobile factors, that is, for capital  K  and labor L. In (4), Island’s rate of
return to capital must in equilibrium equal the exogenous rate of return r  prevailing
in Mainland and the Rest of the World. In equilibrium, similar conditions must surely
apply to the other mobile factor, labor. First, we look at Mainland households. Let  u
m8
be the utility that an immigrant from Mainland could potentially enjoy in Island and let
u  be his reservation level of utility in Mainland. Then two constellations are consistent
with no migration from Mainland to Island. Either we observe  M = 0 because u u
m <
or, alternatively, we have  M > 0 so that u u
m = . In (5), we effectively assume that
the latter constellation applies in the initial equilibrium. Mainland households have
migrated to Island until immigrant households’ utility has been driven down to the
reservation level of utility. - A very similar discussion applies to the migration choices
of those  I  households that are indigenous to Island. Only, in their case we assume that
their level of utility if they migrated to Mainland would be lower than the level u
i  that
they can secure for themselves by staying in Island.
10
Finally, equation (6) defines the tax t  as the ratio of the cost of providing the
government-chosen level of the public input, qg , to the total Island population, L. In
section 4, we will analyze a shock that benefits indigenous households. Surely, then,
the number of indigenous households I  will not change. There we will also analyze a
shock that hurts indigenous households - as well as immigrants. There we suggest that
immigrants are the only ones to leave by assuming that u
i  is much larger than u  in the
initial equilibrium. Hence, the stock of indigenous households I  will not change
throughout the paper. In equations (1) to (6), then, the endogenous variables are
Island’s stock of capital K  and its number of immigrants M , its land rent q, the
levels of utility for indigenous and immigrant households, 
i u  and 
m u , respectively, and
the level of the lump-sum income tax t .
Before turning to comparative statics, we have to address a peculiarity of the model.
When adding up, it becomes clear that not all income generated in the Island-economy
is accounted for in the I  budget equations in (1) and the M  budget equations in (2).
That is, neither income from capital nor income from food capital show up as income
to indigenous or immigrant households. This is for two very different reasons. One
reason is that one would like to think of all capital being imported from the Rest of the
                                                                                                                                      
9 The interpretation of u  would have to change accordingly. For instance, in the case of an
unemployed u  would now mean the level of unemployment benefits.
10  While not necessary, it seems plausible to restrict migration to one direction.9
World, so that, accordingly, all income accruing to capital will flow out of the
economy. Then (i) complete foreign ownership of the specific factor in the electronics
industry, together with (ii) that factor’s perfect international mobility make the
electronics industry Island’s “Foreign-Direct-Investment (FDI)”-industry.
The other reason for unaccounted income in (1) and (2) is that, somewhat inadequately
and merely for reasons of tractability, all food capital is assumed to be foreign-owned,
too. This assumption serves to restrict heterogeneity in net income between indigenous
and immigrant households to the difference in land ownership, nothing more. - It
follows, then, that Island’s capital income from the electronics industry and food
capital income from the food industry is exclusively spent on either tradable goods or
on the Rest of the World’s non-tradable goods. After all, foreign households would, as
non-residents, hardly consume Island’s - non tradable - land area.
11
Taken together and viewed from Island’s perspective, we have an outflow of capital
income plus food capital income to foreign households. By definition, any such net
outflow of income lets gross national product (GNP) fall short of gross domestic
product (GDP), i.e. GNP < GDP. By Walras Law, any such net outflow must result in
a current account surplus. Either in electronics, or in food, or in both industries, will
Islanders need to consume less than they produce.
Substituting (5) and (6) into (1) to (3) and recalling that T  simply equals I  yields the
more compact system of equilibrium equations (7) to (10). Here, the remaining
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11 We hereby overlook the maybe important issue of “tourism”, or foreign direct investment into real
estate.10
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Before examining comparative statics behavior of the equilibrium, it is instructive to
look at equations (7)-(10) one by one. To start, from inspection of the land market
equilibrium in (9), we can see that in the presence of any positive, inelastic government
demand for land (i.e.  0 > g ), indigenous household consumption of land  ) , (
i
q u q e
must be smaller than its land endowment of one unit. Put differently, each indigenous
household is a net seller of land.
(i) For ease of notation, we drop the arguments here and identify indigenous and
immigrant expenditure functions and their derivatives by the index i for indigenous
households and m for immigrant households. Then, a “marginal” increase of q by one
pound increases the indigenous household’s expenditure on land by roughly 
i
q e
pounds. And his taxes increase by  L g  pounds. On the other hand, income from
selling land rises by one pound. The net effect on i’s income then is  L e
i
q g - - 1 .
Reverting back to the equilibrium condition in (9), we see that this expression is
positive if  M > 0 - which we have assumed above. We can conclude that any increase
in the land rent must unambiguously benefit all indigenous households, given their net
selling position vis-à-vis immigrants and government.
(ii) For a moment, let us turn to the immigrant household. It is important to notice that
we have inserted the no-labor-migration condition into his budget constraint (8). This
implies that any increase in q must in some way be compensated as to keep the
immigrant’s utility 
m u  in line with u . The increase in q increases the immigrant’s
expenditure by  L e
m
q g + . In contrast to the indigenous household, no positive effect
shows up as the immigrant does not own land. From (8), accordingly, we can conclude
then that the immigrant’s net wage  t - L r   must c.p. rise (for whichever reasons) by
just the damage  L e
m
q g +  inflicted on him by the land rent increase.11
We can now revisit the indigenous household. Any increase in the net wage  t - L r
due to the no-labor-migration-condition benefits both types of households! The net
impact of a land rent increase on the indigenous household, then, is to increase his
income (i) by the immediate impact  L e
i
q g - - 1 . Moreover and second (ii), there is an
indirect impact via the net wage that increases his income by  L e
m
q g + . The total




q e e - + 1 . More formally, we subtract (8) from (7) to
get  q e e
m i = - .
12 Totally differentiating gives
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Basically, this is just the result we have found above. As the expression in square
brackets is always positive, a higher land rent in Island unambiguously increases
indigenous utility. This reflects the impact of the higher land rent as well as the role of
the no-labor-migration condition.
Returning to the land market equilibrium, we find that the reaction of the land rent to
increasing immigration is ambiguous. To explore why, we look at the land demand
functions of the two types of households in (9). First, immigrant households’ demand
is clearly downward sloping in the land rent. But second, indigenous households’
demand might be upward sloping in the land rent. This is because according to (11) an
increase in the land rent improves indigenous income and, thus, utility. This “income
effect” runs counter to the standard substitution effect. If the former dominates the
latter, then indigenous households’ land demand will increase with the land rent. In this
scenario, then, an excess demand of land brought about by immigration would possibly
only vanish if the land rent decreased.
To sort out these effects, we differentiate (9) totally and insert (11). After rearranging,
we get12
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In the definition of d  in (12), the expression in the first pair of brackets corresponds to
the aggregate substitution effect while the expression in the second pair of brackets is
the now familiar income effect per indigenous household, multiplied by their total




qu e e , which actually is the propensity to consume land given a marginal increase in
income.
13 - In what follows, we will make the assumption that  0 < d  holds, i.e. the
aggregate substitution effect dominates the aggregate income effect. This is a condition
for the Walrasian stability of the land market equilibrium because it implies that the
aggregate Marshallian demand for land is inversely related to the land rent. As is clear
from (12), such  0 < d  implies that an increase in immigrant numbers or a higher level
of the public input will unambiguously increase the land rent.
14
Next, we turn to (8) which, as stressed earlier, after the substitution of u  for 
m u
represents the new no-labor-migration-condition. Equation (8) gives combinations of
electronics capital K  and total labor  I M L + =  that keep immigrant utility at the
reservation level u . On the one hand, an increase of immigrants M  has the following
three (direct and indirect) negative effects on the “incumbent” immigrant’s well-being:
Directly, an increase of labor depresses labor income  L r . Indirectly, and from (12), an
increase of M  drives up the land rent. This not only renders the given level of the
public input more expensive, hence tending to increase taxes. It also raises the
immigrant’s expenditures on land. -  On the other hand, and as the only positive effect
                                                                                                                                      
12 With a positive land rent, indigenous utility must always be higher than immigrant utility. This is
because the indirect utility function increases with higher income.
13 Note that the expenditure function is the inverse of the indirect utility function. Then, 
i
u e 1  simply
is the extra utility from a marginal increase in income.  This extra utility translates via 
i
qu e  into a
change of Hicksian demand.
14 The expression defined by d   corresponds to similar expressions in international trade theory. See,
as one example, Dixit/Norman (1980, p. 131). The important difference is, though, that in trade
theory the income effect comes from (international) redistribution via changing terms of trade while
here (intranational) redistribution is through the land market.13
of increasing immigration, taxes tend to fall as the cost of the public input can be
spread over a larger base of tax payers (an  “agglomeration economy”).
Analytically, we find these results by differentiating (8) totally, substituting dq from










































The first term on the right side of (13) is positive and gives the inflow of electronics
capital needed to “compensate incumbent immigrants for the wage compressing effect
of the immigration of one additional immigrant”. The term in square brackets collects
the various remaining effects. Among these, the two effects relating to a more crowded
land market call for an increase of electronics capital.
Throughout the remainder of the paper, we make the central Stability Assumption that
these two land-market-related crowding effects dominate the “agglomeration
economy” just mentioned.
15 Hence, the sum in square brackets on the right side of (13)
will be positive. In particular, if the no-labor-migration-condition (8) is to hold, then an
increasing number of immigrants in Island has to be countered by an increasing stock
of electronics capital in Island. Hence, if we represented (8) by means of an equilibrium
locus “MM” in a diagram with capital K  and immigrants M  on the axes, this locus
would have to be upward sloping.
While (7) to (9) give one equilibrium locus, equation (10) as the no-capital-migration-
condition gives the other. This locus “KK”  indicates the set of combinations of capital
and immigrated households that keep Island’s return to capital at the level of its
                                               
15 Note that this Stability Assumption implies our earlier assumption that the land market is Walras-
stable. Only if d  is negative, can the expression in square brackets possibly be positive.  - Without the
Stability Assumption assumption, the general equilibrium in the Island economy might not be stable
with respect to changes in factor stocks. This, then, reveals the crucial role of the land market in the
model. Without the dampening impact of the land market, any deviation from equilibrium could
possibly lead to ever increasing inflows of labor and capital (which would be difficult to reconcile with
empirical work).14
corresponding world rate of return  r . From inspection, this locus must be upward
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Before drawing both loci into a diagram, we yet need to compare their slopes. Given












Using a particular property of the specific factors model, the Appendix shows that (15)
actually always holds with equality! Hence, MM actually is steeper than KK, as
sketched in Figure 1. Note, that the left hand side of (15) is the increase in capital, in
response to an increase of labor, that is needed in order to keep the wage rL constant.
Similarly, the right hand side of (15) is the extra capital, in response to an increase of
labor, that is needed in order to keep the capital rental rK constant. Furthermore, both
wage and rental only depend on the ratio of labor to capital within the electronics
sector.
16 Hence, any joint inflow of labor and capital into the economy that should
leave the wage unaffected must leave this ratio constant. But, if the ratio of labor to
capital in the electronics sector remains constant as not to change the wage, then the
return to capital must remain unchanged, too. This motivates the equality of both sides
of (15).
Intuitively, too, does it make sense that the MM-locus is steeper (and not flatter) than
the KK-locus. We have seen that any joint inflow of labor and capital along the KK-
locus keeps the wage as well as the capital rental constant. But along with a higher
number of immigrants, land rents will rise, too (see (12)). If the typical immigrant
household is to stay in Island, he must receive compensation not only for the reduction
                                               
16 For example, the wage is equal to the value marginal product of an additional unit of labor used in
the electronics sector. This value marginal product is homogeneous of degree zero with respect to
capital and labor employed in this sector.15
in the wage due to the higher labor force. He must also be compensated for these rising
land rents.
17 - In Figure 1, overall equilibrium is where the two loci intersect. The
arrows give the dynamics of capital and labor that will set in in disequilibrium. From
these arrows, we can tell that the equilibrium in  A  is stable.  It is this stability which
makes comparative statics, to which we turn next, meaningful.
4. Comparative Statics
We assume that the Island government increases the level of the public input g . After
all, no agent in the private sector has any incentive to do so. As can be seen from
equations (7) to (10), a change in g  impacts on both equilibrium loci. In Figure 2, the
effect of an increase in the public input on the KK-locus is to shift it unambiguously
upwards since  0 > g K r . However, the effect of  0 > g d  on the MM-locus is ambivalent.






























Here, more of the public input makes both industries more productive which in turn
ask for more labor, thereby bidding up the wage rate:  0 > g L r . As opposed to this
single positive effect, a higher g  directly leads to higher taxes. According to (12), a
higher g  also directly raises the land rent, thereby increasing the total costs of public
input provision (and, therefore, taxes) once more. Worse even, the rising land rent
drives up immigrant households’ expenditure for land, leaving them less income to
spend on other goods.
We have to distinguish between two interesting cases, then. In the first case, as
represented in Figure 2, the expression in square brackets in (16) is positive so that
                                               
17 Here we have neglected the positive role of a higher population for the tax rate. But, given our
Stability Assumption, this positive impact is always dominated by the negative impact of higher land
rents. (See equation (13) and subsequent discussion).16
higher government activity must be accompanied by a lower level of capital. The MM-
locus shifts downwards. In the second case, sketched in Figure 3, the expression in
square brackets in (16) is negative so that more government must be complemented by
more capital. Accordingly, the MM-locus shifts upwards. We will return to this
alternative scenario in the following section. Here we focus on the first case.
In Figure 2, the new stable equilibrium is at C , at the new intersection of the two loci.
In C , labor as well as capital have increased. It is standard to split the adjustment
process from the old to the new equilibrium into two parts. Assuming that labor is only
mobile in the long run while capital reacts immediately to international differences in
rentals, we can identify a “sequence” of adjustments. In the short run, only capital
flows from the Rest of the World into Island while no immigration occurs. This leaves
the economy in the immigrant disequilibrium at B , creating an incentive for Mainland
households to move to Island. In the long run expansion from B to C , labor and
capital jointly move into Island, eventually settling at C .
18 Interestingly here, capital
and labor reinforce each other.
The adjustment from  A via B to C  has interesting implications for Island’s industrial
structure. In the short run, the inflow of electronics capital strengthens the FDI-
industry’s productivity. That in turn enables her to pull labor away from food. Hence,
in the short run, there is a boom in the FDI-industry to the detriment of the food
industry. This picture changes somewhat over the course of the economy’s movement
from B  to C . Although capital still keeps flowing in, attracting labor away from food,
now labor flows in, too, benefiting both sectors. This is a joint movement along the
K K ¢ ¢ -locus, so that another unit of labor is accompanied by  KK KL r r -  units of capital
(see (14)). From our earlier discussion (or, alternatively, from the Appendix) we know
that this joint inflow leaves not only the rental, but also the wage unaffected. This
constant wage certainly equals the value marginal product of labor in the food sector
after the public investment has taken place, i.e.  ) , ( ) ( E
F
L L L C f d - + g g . The latter
expression then must stay the same, too. But for a fixed capital stock in the food sector
                                               
18 In this paper, a long run movement always refers to the movement from the short run equilibrium to
the final equilibrium (and not to the movement from the initial to the final equilibrium).17
C  this implies that the labor employed in the food sector  E L L -  stays the same, too.
So in the short run the food industry declines while it “only” stagnates in the long
run.
19
We should associate B  with the open small economy and C  with the very open small
economy. In the short run, when moving from  A to B, wages rise because of both the
increase in g  and the induced inflow of capital. Also, land rents increase. Since the
economy’s GNP is equal to wage income plus land income, GNP clearly rises. In the
long run, when moving from B to C , GNP rises even further. While the wage rate
now stays constant along the  K K ¢ ¢ -locus, employment in the economy expands. Also,
the land rent continues to increase.
It appears that labor’s option to migrate into the very open small economy increases
the inflow of capital beyond the expansion that would have taken place in the case of
the open small economy. So allowing households an additional spatial flexibility
increases the  - g shock’s expansionary impact on the economy’s GNP. While the extra
rise of the economy’s GNP thus seems an attractive feature of the very open small
economy, it also raises the question of whether an outflow of capital might be
reinforced by a simultaneous outflow of labor. This last point suggests that stronger
GNP-fluctuations could occur in the very open small economy as opposed to the
merely open small economy.
In the context of the model, different sources of exogenous shocks to Island’s
economy come to mind. Here we focus on the case where, because of Island’s
negligible political clout in international organizations, Island’s government might be
forced to increase its tax rate on electronics capital. In the case of Ireland, for instance,
Krugman (1997, p. 53) fears this type of adverse shock to come from the efforts of the
European Union to harmonize taxes on mobile capital across all member countries.
                                               
19 Also note that the relative autarky price of electronics falls. To be sure, this marginal change is
unlikely to affect the comparative advantage.18
If we reinterpret r  as the rate of return prevailing in the rest of the world plus any
taxes on capital in Island, a rise in  r  could reflect the scenario where Island
unilaterally raises its tax on mobile capital. From equations (7) to (10), we can see that
such a policy move only affects the KK-locus. In Figure 4, the KK-locus shifts
downwards, giving rise to a new long run equilibrium in C . The short run equilibrium
is in B. As in the preceding section’s scenario the short run effect becomes even more
pronounced in the long run, as a result of the combined outflow of labor and capital.
So again we have the result that in the long run flows of mobile factors reinforce each
other. Only, here this mutual reinforcement happens to depress Island’s economy.
More generally, in a response to a rise in  r  the very open small economy’s GNP
shrinks more than the open small economy’s GNP.
20
5. Welfare
In the previous section, we have focused on factor flows into the Island economy that
may result from public investment. Ultimately, though, we must be interested in
changes in Island households’ welfare rather than in the mere size of the Island
economy. These welfare changes crucially hinge on the very-open-small-economy-
assumption, i.e. on perfect labor mobility between Island and Mainland. First, by the
assumption embodied in (5), incumbent immigrant households do not experience any
change in utility across equilibria. Second, reverting back to our discussion of (11),
indigenous household utility unambiguously increases as land rents rise. In figure 2, the
new equilibrium C is clearly Pareto-superior to the old equilibrium A. - While this
Pareto-superiority is reassuring, the deepened discrepancy between immigrant utility
and indigenous household utility is not.
Where do the income increases for immigrant households from higher productivity and
higher electronics capital go? Differentiating no-migration-condition (8) totally gives
                                               
20 Curiously, the scenario of an FDI-industry that leaves the host economy does not seem to be a
recurrent theme in the economics literature, not even in countries that are largely dependent on it.
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The right-hand side of (17) collects the different sources of net income gain to
incumbent immigrants. The terms in brackets give the change in the gross wage drL.
To this, add the agglomeration benefit from sharing the cost of the pure public input
with more households. From this, take away the increase in individual taxes due to
higher infrastructure costs. In the new equilibrium C, immigration from Mainland to
Island has driven the land rents up to a level where the income gains from higher net
wages and economies of agglomeration is completely offset by higher rents.
Note that  ) ( L e
m
q g +  corresponds to an immigrant household’s effective demand for
land. This expression includes land for personal use eq
m  as well as land „indirectly“
consumed, i.e. an immigrant’s tax share of government demand for land. Multiplying
(17) with M and replacing  M e L q
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This then is the essence of introducing costless migration: In the new equilibrium C all
potential income gains to incumbent immigrant households have capitalized into higher
rents. Note that the left hand side of (18) represents effective net land supply of
indigenous households, multiplied with the change in land rent. Thus, the increase in
indigenous households’ aggregate rent income derived from immigrants exactly equals
the increase in aggregate gains that would have accrued to immigrants had
capitalization not taken place. This clearly calls to mind related results in urban
economics where, under the „open city“ assumption, migration either within or
between cities leads to capitalization.
21
                                               
21 For example, see Starrett (1981) and Hartwick (1993). Note that in typical urban economics models
the land owner is often not explicitly taken into account. Either the “landlord is absent”, or all income
from land is equally distributed among households. Note, too, that unlike “true” urban economics
models, this model does not clarify the internal spatial structure of the city.20
We have identified the extent of redistribution through the land market. In order to
take a closer look at the indigenous households, as the beneficiaries of this

























All terms in square brackets are familiar by now: Income gains for indigenous
households include gains from better infrastructure, more capital, and agglomeration
economies (minus higher taxes); on top of that they also capture the benefits to
immigrant households from the same sources.
Using individual marginal utilities of income as weights, we can calculate the welfare
change for those households that were present in Island before the public investment
shock. This change in aggregate welfare dW  is equal to dW = Ie du Me du u
i i
u
m m + ,
then. Exploiting du
m = 0, (18), and (19), this simplifies into
(20) dW L r dK r dM r d
q
L
dM qd LK LL L = + + + - ( ) g g
g
g
(20) gives the marginal change in aggregate welfare to Island households. The first two
terms reflect the marginal benefits of dg , while the last term has the marginal cost of
dg . Island society’s marginal benefits come from higher wages and agglomeration
economies, while marginal costs reflect land lost to infrastructure. Of course, because
changes in the land rent are purely redistributional, they do not enter the aggregate
welfare change. Note, too, that changes in aggregate capital income cannot feature in
(20) because they only affect households residing elsewhere. As non-residents these
households are irrelevant to Island welfare.
22
                                               
22 We also neglect the gains accruing to newly arriving immigrants.21
In comparing (20) with (18), we see that the aggregate welfare change can also be
expressed in terms of the change in aggregate rent payments of immigrant households:
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We could call (21) a corrected „hedonic benefit measure“. The insight here is that
(marginal) aggregate welfare changes dW  can actually be calculated from (marginal)
aggregate effective rent income changes, i.e. I e L dq q
i ( ) 1- -g . In an urban model
lacking a separate class of landowners, the complete benefit to Islanders induced
through public investment would simply be Idq (see, as an example, Kanemoto
(1988)). In this model, in contrast, Idq has to be corrected twice. First, not all
available land is actually supplied to renters, leaving an effective land supply of only
) 1 ( L e I
i
q g - - . Second, income increases for land owning indigenous households
naturally do not capitalize into higher rents. The expression for the welfare change in
(21) takes these two corrections into account.
Equation (21) can provide interesting information for the Island government. The
welfare change dW  is positive if and only if dq > 0.  But dq is observable. So the
change in rent may serve as an indicator to government indicating the sign of the
welfare effect of public investment into the public input. Beyond the information on the
sign of the welfare change, government might also want to calculate the extent of the
welfare change. In (21), the Island population’s composition (M  and I ) and overall
size  ) (L  are observable as are government land use g  and indigenous households’ lot
size 
i
q e . - The hedonic benefit indicator is useful: not every increase in g  is welfare
enhancing. As an illustration of a counterproductive public investment we briefly look
at a scenario left unexplored in the previous section. If the expression in square
brackets in (16) is negative, the MM locus, in reaction to dg > 0, shifts upwards, not
downwards. This may lead to falling land rents (and so it is drawn in Figure 3), and,
hence, to falling Island welfare.22
6. A Case Study: Ireland 1970-1999
In its assumptions, the model captures a number of features specific to Ireland. We
first turn to the assumptions’ Irish equivalents as to where migrants and capital come
from as well as to who owns the economy’s industries. Next, we contrast the model’s
results with the Irish experience. In this case study, “Island” should really be read as
the Dublin area, not as Ireland as a whole. First, this is because we have modeled an
invariable supply of land, an assumption that is more adequate for an urban area than
for a very sparsely populated country.
23 Second, the bulk of FDI actually flows into the
Dublin region. And third, we would like to include migrants from Ireland’s peripheral
regions to Dublin into our concept of an “immigrant”, too.
“Mainland”, on the other hand, not only contains the Irish periphery. Following Fitz
Gerald (1999), over the course of the 1990’s there has also been net immigration into
Ireland. These immigrants are largely emigrants that return from the UK, and from
European countries. Hence, UK and Europe should be included in Mainland as well.
To give a flavor of this remigration’s extent, Fitz Gerald (p. 6) reports that “... by 1996
nearly 20% of the 30-34 age group were returned emigrants”.  It is in exhibiting such
an extremely mobile work force, that Ireland is often considered to be more a “Region
of Europe” than a “Country in Europe” (see Krugman 1997, p. 39).
The “Rest of the World”, in the model, encompasses the world’s remaining households
who, as the “investors”, own all of Island’s electronics capital as well as food capital
and who thus receive all income from these specific factors. According to Barry (1999,
p. 51), in 1995 roughly two thirds of the total, foreign owned, gross manufacturing
output was produced by US subsidiaries. In turn, total gross manufacturing output in
Ireland’s foreign-owned companies was again roughly two thirds of total (foreign
owned and Irish owned) gross manufacturing output in Ireland. For modeling
purposes, the impressive weight of the US subsidiaries in the Irish industry should
allow us to assume a total US ownership of at least the manufacturing industry.
                                               
23 The Dublin area seems to suit the assumption of an inelastic land supply remarkably well - being
limited in its expansion by the coastline in the East, the Wicklow mountains in the South, the airport23
The “Rest of the World” is equivalent to the US, therefore. The model’s GDP/GNP
gap shows up in the income flow leaving Ireland. This difference between GDP and
GNP has reached approximately 9.5 billion pounds in 1998 (Central Bank of Ireland,
1999, p. 25). Naturally, the connection between this factor income outflow and the
current account is not as straightforward as in the model. The trade surplus in 1998,
with 18.8 billion pounds, is roughly twice as large as the factor income outflow.
Interestingly, this huge surplus is not with the United States as might be expected from
the ownership of the FDI-industry but rather with the European countries (excluding
UK). This why Ireland at times has been called an “export platform”.
The distinction between FDI-industry and indigenous industry in the Irish policy
discussion carries over to the model, though in an admittedly very crude manner. On
the one hand, the FDI-industry strongly resembles the foreign owned plants that cluster
predominantly in electronics, metal, engineering and chemicals. On the other hand, the
model’s food industry represents the remaining manufacturing industries in Ireland that
are often subsumed as the „indigenous sector“.
We now turn to the model results’ equivalents in Ireland. The direct impact of public
investment is to increase the return to capital. Also, immigrant household utility rises
along with indigenous household utility. The indirect impact of public investment is to
attract electronics capital and labor which contribute to increasing production of
electronics and food. The model’s “agglomeration” of factors of production in the
Dublin area and the ensuing high growth rates of Irish GDP, then, give the “Celtic
Tiger”. Also, the Celtic Tiger is characterized by rising net income. This is because
otherwise immigrant households would not be able to afford the higher rents (C  in
Figure 2) without being worse off than in Mainland, something we have excluded in
the no-labor-migration-condition which must hold in equilibrium.
Parallel to real growth, the indigenous industry has shrunk up until the mid 1990’s
while it has slowly expanded since. Such a “U-curve” is suggested by the model’s
results, too, where in the short run (i.e. for a given labor supply) the FDI sector’s
                                                                                                                                      
in the North, and environmental concerns in the West. Nevertheless, the urban sprawl appears to24
expansion forces the traditional sector to release resources. This is the familiar
“resource movement effect” from the literature on resource booms (see, e.g.
Corden/Neary, 1982). But in the long run, the traditional sector’s decline comes to a
halt.
Finally, we comment on the land rent increase in Island’s economy. This is the urban
economics side of the model. In Figure 2, the immigration of households and the
increased government demand for land to build industrial estates on clearly drive up
the land rent. - Although the land supply in the Dublin area is in fact not fixed, housing
prices have soared over the last years. O’Connell and Quinn (1999, p. 69) present data
for the Dublin area, according to which the price of second hand residential housing in
1998 alone rose by 35%.
24 Here the model offers the following interpretation: The
economic boom generates income gains for all households. But via immigration the
income gains of non land owning households are quickly capitalized into rents. Rising
housing prices, then, rather reflect the strength of the Celtic Tiger than a “bubble” in
the housing market.
In this context it is tempting to try a Public Choice perspective. According to
Eurostat’s (1996) data on Ireland, the share of “rented dwellings” in the “total stock of
dwellings” in 1993 amounted to a mere 18%. This figure is certainly only vaguely
related to the gains from land ownership that are prominent in the model. But we
might still expect the surge in housing prices to meet a more widespread acceptance in
Irish society than with the much lower level of homeownership so typical of many
other countries.
                                                                                                                                      
continue nevertheless (with the exception of Easterly directions). See Williams/Sheels (2000).
24 For a much more detailed discussion, see Roche (1999).25
7.  Conclusion
As central results of public investment into the very open small economy’s general
infrastructure we find:
(1) Agglomeration. Public investment causes the expected inflow of mobile capital.
But labor flows in, too. These two inflows reinforce each other.
(2) Sectoral Change. Factor inflows affect the balance between the two domestic
industries. The industry using mobile capital expands. The other industry suffers.
(3) Efficiency. In the new equilibrium, indigenous households are better off, while
immigrant household utility stays the same. The new equilibrium is Pareto-superior.
(4) Redistribution. Income gains to immigrant households are completely capitalized
into higher rents, thus being redistributed to land owners. Inequality rises.
(5) Policy. In the model, we derive a “hedonic benefit measure” that gives the welfare
gain from public investment. This measure uses observable data on rents, land owners
and renters, government land use, and effective land supply.
And a prediction on the economy’s reaction to a negative shock is the following:
(6) Vulnerability. For a rise in the domestic tax on mobile capital, mobile capital and
immigrant labor leave. These outflows reinforce each other. The very open small
economy appears more vulnerable than the open small economy.
In many respects do predictions (1) through (4) fit the recent Irish boom well. Do
these results generalize? For example, we could test the model’s predictions by looking
at other very open small economies that are also attracting strong inflows of FDI and
labor such as Singapore, Hong Kong, and Luxemburg. But maybe there is an even
broader range of potential applications. Maybe FDI inflows are much more localized
than the available data on the national and regional level suggest. Warsaw and
Budapest, for example, appear to be the main recipients of FDI in Poland and
Hungary. In these cases, the “open city”-model could prove a helpful framework when
analyzing two issues central to FDI: What are its overall benefits to the host country?
And how are these benefits distributed?26
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We do this in four steps. First, equilibrium in the labor market holds if aggregate labor
demand equals exogenous labor supply L:




L E L L C f L K f p - = g g
From this, we can infer that the optimal labor allocation  E L  reacts to exogenous
changes in L and K , i.e.  ) , ( L K L L E E = .
Second, we recall that the wage rate  L r  and the capital rental  K r  are equal to the value
marginal products of labor and capital at the revenue maximizing allocation of labor,
respectively:
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Using (A2) and (A3), we can calculate the reactions of wage and rental to changes in
L and K , i.e.  LK KL KK r r r , ,  and  LL r .
25 In doing this, however, we have to account for
the change in the optimal labor allocation  ) , ( L K L L E E = , too. Dropping the
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Fourth, since the partial derivatives of the electronics production function 
E
K f  and 
E
L f
are each homogeneous of degree zero in K  and  E L , we can apply Euler’s theorem








LK - = . But this actually
implies that (15) holds with equality!
Crucially here, we exploit the property of the specific factors model that each
production function only depends on two of the three available inputs. The
interpretation of the quotients on both sides of equation (A8) is straightforward. These
are the “marginal rates of substitution” that trade off electronics capital against labor in
order to keep (i) the wage rate and (ii) the capital rental at a fixed level.
                                                                                                                                      
25 Actually, since the revenue function in the Dixit/Norman-framework is twice differentiable, we
have  LK KL r r = .28
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